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INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND THE POLITICAL
OFFENSE EXCEPTION: THE GRANTING OF POLITICAL
OFFENDER STATUS TO TERRORISTS BY UNITED STATES
COURTS
International cooperation in the return of fugitive offenders can be
traced back some three thousand years.1 Until the nineteenth century
the main focus of formal extradition' proceedings was the return of
political offenders.8 The economic changes and political upheavals of
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, particularly the
American and French revolutions, brought about a radical change in
this practice." The newly developed liberal democracies, having a re-
spect for individual freedoms and for the right of political dissent, were
very willing to provide a safe haven for those fleeing the repression of
less enlightened regimes.8 The improvements in modes of communica-
1. In 1280 B.C. a peace treaty between Rameses II of Egypt and the Hittite prince
Hattusili III provided for the return of criminals of one state found in the territory of
the other. I.A. SHEARER, EXTRADITION IN INTERNATIONAL LAW 5 (1971).
2. Extradition may be defined as the formal surrender by a state of a person found
within its jurisdiction to another state for trial or punishment. See Research in Interna-
tional Law Under the Auspices of the Faculty of the Harvard Law School, 29 AM. J.
INT'L L. 15, 21 (Supp. 1935) [hereinafter cited as Harvard Research].
3. The overwhelming concern of medieval states was with the preservation of their
national sovereignty and their very unsecure power structures. They feared that if dissi-
dents or defeated rivals for power had the ability to regroup in neighboring states they
would return and threaten the status quo. This common interest in self-preservation
made the return of political refugees an acceptable practice. See Epps, The Validity of
the Political Offender Exception in Extradition Treaties in Anglo-American Jurispru-
dence, 20 HARv. INT'L L. J. 61, 62 (1979). Until the nineteenth century, extradition trea-
ties were entered into for the specific purpose of returning political offenders. See Deere,
Political Offenses in the Law and Practice of Extradition, 27 AM: J. INT'L L. 247, 249
(1933).
4. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 108.
5. McCall-Smith & Magee, The Anglo-Irish Law Enforcement Report in Historical
and Political Context, 1975 CRIM. L. REV. 200.
The political tenor of that era is reflected in the following passage from John Stuart
Mill's On Liberty:
The aim. . . of patriots was to set limits to the power which the ruler should be
suffered to exercise over the community; and this limitation was what they
meant by liberty. It was attempted in two ways. First, by obtaining a recognition
of certain immunities, called political liberties or rights, which it was to be re-
garded as a breach of duty in the ruler to infringe, and which, if he did infringe,
specific resistance, or general rebellion, was held to be justifiable.
J.S. MILL, On Liberty, in THREE ESSAYS: ON LIBERTY, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT, THE
SUBJECTION OF WOMEN 6 (1975).
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tion and transportation brought on by the Industrial Revolution facili-
tated not only the flight of the politically repressed but also the escape
of common criminals.6 The growing awareness among states of the ex-
istence of an international community bound together in economic and
social development led to the identification of a common interest in
the suppression of crime.7 As a result, states began to focus their ef-
forts and resources towards the extradition of those accused of criminal
acts, and they began to incorporate an exception for those accused of
political offenses into their municipal laws' and international treaties.9
Typical of the framing of this exception is Article V of the extradi-
tion treaty between the United Kingdom and the United States.10 It
provides that extradition shall not be granted if
(i) the offense for which extradition is requested is regarded by
the requested Party as one of a political character; or (ii) the
person sought proves that the request for his extradition has in
fact been made with a view to try or punish him for an offense
of a political character.
The absence in these laws and treaties of criteria by which the exis-
tence of a "political offense," as opposed to a criminal and, therefore,
extraditable offense, could be determined has necessitated a case-by-
6. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 109.
7. See Garcia-Mora, The Nature of Political Offenses: A Knotty Problem of Extradi-
tion Law, 48 VA. L. REv. 1226, 1228 (1962); Note, American Courts and Modern Terror-
ism: The Politics of Extradition, 13 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & POL. 617, 620 (1981).
8. In 1833 Belgium became the first country to incorporate this exception into its
municipal law. Note, supra note 7, at 620.
9. The extradition treaty of 1834 between France and Belgium incorporated this ex-
ception and became the model for many subsequent treaties. Hannay, International
Terrorism and the Political Offense Exception to Extradition, 18 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L
L. 381, 385 (1979).
10. Extradition Treaty, June 8, 1972-October 21, 1976, United States-United King-
dom, 28 U.S.T. 227, T.I.A.S. No. 8468 [hereinafter cited as United States-United King-
dom Extradition Treaty].
11. Id. art. V, para. 1(c). For variations in the formulation of the exception in other
bilateral treaties to which the United States is a party, see Bassiouni, Ideologically Moti-
vated Offenses and the Political Offenses Exception in Extradition-A Proposed Jurid-
ical Standard for an Unruly Problem, 19 DE PAuL L. REV. 217, 260 (1969).
Although the United States will entertain extradition requests only where provided
for by treaty obligations, see, e.g., Factor v. Laubenheimer, 290 U.S. 276, 287 (1933),
other countries have frequently resorted to extradition based upon the principles of com-
ity and reciprocity. See generally Evans, Legal Bases of Extradition in the United
States, 16 N.Y.L.F. 525, 530 (1970). Abduction, kidnapping and deportation have also
been resorted to on a number of occasions. See, e.g., Attorney-General of the Govern-
ment of Israel v. Adolf Eichmann, 36 I.L.R. 277, 305 (Israel Sup. Ct. 1962); O'Higgins,
Disguised Extradition: The Soblen Case, 27 MOD. L. REv. 521 (1964).
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case analysis of the circumstances of the accused's actions and of the
motivations of the requesting state."' Because the nonextradition of
political offenders is not accepted as a principle of international law,18
states have wide discretion in deciding under which circumstances and
for which policy reasons they will apply or not apply the. exception.14
Some countries, such as the Untied States and Great Britain, define
the concept of a political offense broadly in deference to the claims of
the individual while others, in the spirit of international cooperation,
have favored a narrower interpretation. 5 Of the two broad categories
of political offenses, only in the area of "pure" political offenses has
there been any uniform interpretation. A pure political offense is the
"subjective threat to a political ideology or its supporting structures
without any of the elements of a common crime. It is labeled a 'crime'
because the interest sought to be protected is the sovereign."' This
class of political crime has been limited to acts of treason, sedition and
espionage,17 and courts have consistently held that such offenses fall
within the political offense exception.18
"Relative" political offenses have proven much more difficult for
the courts to define."0 In this situation the offender is accused of com-
mitting one or more common crimes, but he makes the claim that they
were committed in furtherance of political, not criminal, ends. The
courts, in trying to reconcile political dissidents' claims for asylum with
the international community's policy of cooperation in the suppression
12. See Note, supra note 7, at 618.
13. See, e.g., Chandler v. United States, 171 F.2d 921, 935 (1st Cir. 1948), cert. de-
nied, 336 U.S. 918 (1949). See also State (Duggan) v. Tapley, 1951 Ir. R. 62, 18 I.L.R. 336
(Ir. Sup. Ct. 1951), where the Irish Supreme Court stated that:
The attempt . . .to establish that the non-surrender of political refugees is a
generally recognized principle of international law fails. The farthest that the
matter can be put is that international law permits and favours the refusal of
extradition of persons accused or convicted of offenses of a political character
but allows it to each State to exercise its own judgment as to whether it will
grant or refuse extradition in such cases and also as to the limitations which it
will impose upon such provisions as exempt from extradition.
1951 Ir. R. at 84, 18 I.L.R. at 343.
14. Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1227.
15. Id. at 1228.
16. Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 245.
17. Harvard Research, supra note 2, at 113. See generally Garcia-Mora, Treason,
Sedition and Espionage as Political Offenses Under the Law of Extradition, 26 U. Prrr.
L. REv. 65 (1964).
18. Cantrell, The Political Offense Exemption in International Extradition: A Com-
parison of the United States, Great Britain and the Republic of Ireland, 60 MARQ. L.
REv. 777, 780 (1977).
19. Note, Terrorist Extradition and the Political Offense Exception: An Administra-
tive Solution, 21 VA. J. INT'L L. 163, 164 (1980).
1983]
N.Y.L. SCH. J. INT'L & COMP. L.
of crime and the punishment of criminals, have developed a confused
"collection of principles, often dictated by political events and chang-
ing circumstances."' 0 Commentators have justly criticized this situa-
tion because the subjective nature of the inquiry into the circum-
stances of the offense can lead to the protection of offenders whose acts
are too tenuously related to their avowed political ends or can lead to
the extradition of those to whom asylum ought to be granted.2" The
decisions in this area have also been criticized for having been based
too often on "politically orientated national interpretations and not on
any sound juridical basis."22
While it was not overly difficult to distinguish between "common
crimes" and "political offenses" in the early part of this century,2 3 the
distinctions have been blurred by the increased tactical use in recent
decades of urban terrorism by radicals who seek political and social
change.24 The targets of these urban guerrillas are frequently not just
the military or government structures but, also, the civilian population
and the social institutions of the state. In aiming to bring about the
collapse of existing power structures such terrorists seek "to demon-
strate that the state cannot protect its citizens, cannot enforce the rule
of law and is, consequently, ungovernable. '25 The Irish Republican
Army (I.R.A.) and the Palestinian Liberation Organization (P.L.O.) are
typical of modern urban terrorist organizations in their use of random
violence in an effort to destroy the existing social and political fabric of
the state. Developments in technology have enabled them to operate
on a transnational level and to escape into other jurisdictions when in
danger of being captured.2
This Note will examine the development of the political offense
exception and its application in the United States courts to cases in-
volving extradition requests for terrorists who have fled to these
shores. The decisions in this area clearly demonstrate the lack of man-
ageable judicial standards for determining the appropriateness of
granting political offender status to members of a terrorist group given
the contemporary community preference that political change be ac-
complished only through non-violent methods. The problems that exist
20. Cantrell, supra note 18, at 780.
21. Note, supra note 7, at 618.
22. Bassiouni, supra note 11, at 220.
23. Id. at 218.
24. Id.
25. Lowry, Terrorism and Human Rights: Counter-Insurgency and Necessity at
Common Law, 53 NoTRE DAME LAW. 49, 50 (1977).
26. Carbonneau, Terrorist Acts-Crimes or Political Infractions? An Appraisal of
Recent French Extradition Cases, 3 HASTINGS INT'L & Comp. L. REv. 265, 266 (1979).
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and the factors that are considered were clearly demonstrated in four
recent cases involving requests for the extradition of members of these
two notorious terrorist groups-the I.R.A. and the P.L.O.
In In re McMullen,27 In re Mackin"s and Quinn v. Robinson,2 9 re-
quests for the extradition of I.R.A. members were denied when the
courts, applying the traditional common law test, held that acts of ter-
rorism were political offenses. In Eain v. Wilkes,80 however, this tradi-
tional test was altered, and the court granted an Israeli request for the
extradition of a Palestinian guerrilla accused of killing civilians in an
Israeli town.
The reason for the disparate treatment afforded members of two
equally despicable terrorist organizations lies not in the status of the
victims but in the fact that the focus of the analysis used in the I.R.A.
cases did not go beyond the narrow parameters laid out by British
judges, in the context of nineteenth century political and social per-
spectives,8 ' in In re Castioni.s1
Castioni was the landmark English case that first construed the
phrase "offense of a political character." 8 The Castioni court stated
that "fugitive criminals are not to be surrendered for extradition
crimes, if those crimes were incidental to and formed a part of political
disturbances."" Castioni laid down two conditions that must be met in
order to bring an otherwise criminal act within the political offense ex-
ception: First, there must be "a political matter, a political rising, or a
dispute between two parties in the State, as to which is to have the
27. No. 3-78-1099 MG (M.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
28. No. 80 Cr. Misc. 1, p. 54 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), afl'd, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir.
1981).
29. No. C-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Ca. 1983).
30. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
31. See SHEARER, supra note 1, at 180.
32. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
33. British extradition law is governed by The Extradition Act, 1870, 33 & 34 Vict.,
ch. 52, which provides in relevant part:
(1) A fugitive criminal shall not be surrendered if the offense to which his sur-
render is demanded is one of a political character or if he proves to the satisfac-
tion of the police magistrate or the court before whom he is brought on habeas
corpus, or to the Secretary of State that the requisition for his surrender has in
fact been made with a view to try and punish him for an offense of a political
character.
Id. at § 3(1).
As in most extradition laws and treaties, no legislative attempt was made to define
the meaning, or provide the context of, the term "offense of a political character."
34. Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 166. This was the definition offered by Justice Stephen,
a member of the Castioni court. See also 2 J. STEPsHEN, A HIsToRy OF THE CmmiNAL LAW
OF ENGLAND 71 (1883).
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government in its hands. .... "3 Second, it must be shown that the
"act is done in furtherance of, done with the intention of assistance, as
a sort of overt act in the course of"'B a political rising or dispute.
37
Angelo Castioni had fled to England from the Swiss canton of Ti-
cino where he had shot and killed a member of the local government
during an attack by the townspeople on the municipal palace. The at-
tack was brought on by the refusal of the government to hold a refer-
endum on a citizens' petition for a revision of the provincial Constitu-
tion.38 The court found that because Castioni was "acting as one of a
number of persons engaged in acts of violence of a political character
with a political object, and as part of the political movement and rising
in which he was taking part,"" his act was "political" and, therefore,
non-extraditable. 40
Three years later the British courts drew back from the broad
sweep of Castioni and narrowed the definition of the term "relative"
political offense. In In re Meunier,4 the French Government requested
the extradition of an avowed anarchist who had been found guilty and
sentenced to death in absentia by a French court for having set off
explosions at a restaurant and a military barracks. The English court,
in granting the request, stated that:
[I]n order to constitute an offense of a political character, there
must be two or more parties in the State, each seeking to im-
pose the government of their own choice on the other, and
35. Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 156.
36. Id.
37. The court rejected an interpretation of the phrase offered by John Stuart Mill
that a political offense was any offense "committed in the course of or furthering a civil
war, insurrection or riot." SHEARER, supra note 1, at 169-70.
38. Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 150. Following the takeover of the palace, a provisional
government was formed and remained in power until ousted by the forces of the federal
government. Id. at 151.
39. Id. at 159.
40. Id. at 160. In the second of the three separate opinions in this case, Mr. Justice
Hawkins stated that:
I cannot help thinking that everybody knows there are many acts of a political
character done without reason, done against all reason; but at the same time one
cannot look too hardly and weigh in golden scales the acts of men hot in their
political excitement. We know that in heat and in heated blood men often do
things which are contrary to reason; but nonetheless an act of this description
may be done for the purpose of furthering and in furtherance of a political ris-
ing, even though it is an act which may be deplored and lamented, as even cruel
and against all reason, by those who can calmly reflect upon it after the battle is
over.
Id. at 167.
41. [1894] 2 Q.B. 415, 419.
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that, if the offense is committed by one side or the other in
pursuance of that object, it is a political offense, otherwise
not.4
The court concluded that "the party of anarchy is the enemy of all
Governments" and because their "efforts are directed primarily against
the general body of citizens" they cannot avail themselves of the politi-
cal offense exception.48 This was an implicit policy-oriented application
of the Castioni definition and set the stage for future case-by-case ap-
plications of this political incidence test.
The political offense exception was initially incorporated to pro-
tect an individual's right to rebel against tyrannical government. The
"political incidence" test came into being in an era when the individual
activist was perceived as being merely an agent of a political movement
or party.44 Despite the fact that contemporary political activism in gen-
eral, and terrorism in particular, is often characterized by individuals
or small groups acting alone without any connection with an estab-
lished political party or movement,4 the political incidence test contin-
ues to be applied by United States courts as the controlling definition
of what constitutes a non-extraditable offense.
The first United States judicial analysis of the political offense ex-
ception occurred in the case of In re Ezeta."4 The Republic of Salvador
had requested the extradition of its former President, Ezeta, and four
of his officers who were accused of murder and bank robbery during
their unsuccessful attempts to supress revolutionary forces. Stressing
the existence of a state of armed conflict, the court applied the Cas-
tioni political incidence test and held that, even though the acts were
committed by government officials attempting to maintain their au-
thority,47 they came within the exception because "the crimes charged
here, associated as they are with the actual conflict of armed forces, are
of a political character."48
The adaptation of the political incidence test into United States
case law occurred in the Supreme Court's only opinion on the political
42. Id.
43. Id. One commentator cited the wave of anarchist violence which swept Western
Europe between the years 1842 and 1894 as the reason for the English court's decision to
exclude anarchists from the political offense exception. See Hannay, supra note 9, at
388-89.
44. See Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1242.
45. See id.
46. 62 F. 972 (N.D. Cal. 1894).
47. Id. at 1002.
48. Id. at 999.
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offense exception. In Ornelas v. Ruiz4" Mexico requested the extradi-
tion of three members of an anti-government group who had entered
Mexico from Texas and attacked a small garrison of Mexican soldiers
stationed near the border. Before returning to the United States, they
assaulted and robbed some local villagers. In applying the political in-
cidence test to the facts before it, the Court found that the offenses
were not of a political character because the revolutionaries had not
been in contact with government forces at the time they attacked the
villagers.50
The political offense exception next appeared in United States
courts some fifty years later in a series of cases involving war-time
atrocities carried out pursuant to the orders of the Interior Minister in
the Nazi-dominated Croatian Government. In Artukovic v. Boyle5" the
communist government of Yugoslavia requested the extradition of Ar-
tukovic for having ordered the executions of tens of thousands of
people.5
2
The district court, noting the state of hostilities that existed in the
area at that time, concluded that extradition should be denied because
the offenses were of a political character.5" On appeal, the Ninth Cir-
cuit applied the Castioni incidence test and affirmed the decision, not-
ing "that various factions representing different theories of government
were struggling for power during this period in Croatia.""' In reaching
its decision the Ninth Circuit had rejected the argument that the ex-
ception did not apply to war crimes or other crimes against human-
ity.5 5 It had held that the United Nations resolutions of 1946 and 1947
relating to the surrender of war criminals did not have "sufficient force
49. 161 U.S. 502, 510 (1896).
50. Id. at 511. The court used this opportunity to narrow the scope of appellate re-
view in a habeas corpus petition by holding that the question was whether, on the facts,
the initial fact-finder had "no choice" but to find that the petitioner's acts were part of a
"movement in aid of a revolt, an insurrection, or a civil war." Id.
51. 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956). This case led an up and down life in the
United States court system for seven years before it wasfinally decided. See Artukovic v.
Boyle, 107 F. Supp. 11 (S.D. Cal. 1952) (habeas corpus petition granted), rev'd sub nom.
Ivancevic v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9th Cir.) (reversal based on interpretation of treaty
between United States and Yugoslavia), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 818, reh'g denied, 348
U.S. 889 (1954); Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245 (S.D. Cal. 1956) (extradition de-
nied because acts found to be of a political character), aff'd sub nom. Karadzole v. Ar-
tukovic, 247 F.2d 198 (9th Cir. 1957), vacated and remanded, 355 U.S. 393 (1958). Ulti-
mately this case was reversed on procedural grounds, United States v. Artukovic, 170 F.
Supp. 383 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
52. Artukovic v. Boyle, 140 F. Supp. 245, 246-47 (S.D. Cal. 1956).
53. Id. at 247.
54. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 247 F.2d 198, 204 (9th Cir. 1957).
55. 247 F.2d at 205.
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of law to modify long standing judicial interpretations of similar treaty
provisions."" After the trial court's judgment was vacated by the Su-
preme Court on procedural grounds,5 the lower court again found the
offenses to have been political within the meaning of the Castioni
test. 8
Some commentators have suggested that the political philosophy
of the requesting state in Artukovic was more influential than were the
merits of the case.59 The result was a perversion of the policies that led
to the adaptation of the exception and was a totally unwarranted ap-
plication of the Castioni test. As one commentator noted,
[t]he connection existing between Artukovic's common offense
and his alleged political act is so feeble that the political char-
acter of the crime has accordingly disappeared. It requires lit-
tle effort to realize that the thousands of killings attributed to
him have absolutely nothing to do with an offense against the
state . 60
Another instance of the expansive use of the political offense ex-
ception to deny extradition of an offender to a communist country was
Ramos v. Diaz.81 In this case, the Castro Government requested the
return of two Cubans who had been convicted in Cuba of the murder
of a prisoner they had been guarding while in the service of Castro's
army. Despite the fact that the incident had occurred three days after
the fall of the Batista Government on January 7, 1959, the court ap-
plied the Castioni test. It found the offenses were incidental to and
formed part of a political disturbance and, thus, denied the request.62
56. Id.
57. Karadzole v. Artukovic, 355 U.S. 393 (1958).
58. 170 F. Supp. at 392-93.
59. See Epps, supra note 3, at 72.
60. Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1248. Apparently Artukovic was not the only war
criminal to receive sympathetic treatment by the United States. The extradition of
Klaus Barbie from Bolivia to France to face charges of "crimes against humanity" for his
role in the murders of thousands of French Resistance leaders and Jews brought to light
the fact that the United States had blocked French attempts to bring him to trial in
return for his having supplied United States intelligence with information. Dionne,
Klaus Barbie's Return Awakens a Bitter Past, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1983, at E3, col. 1.
61. 179 F. Supp. 459 (S.D. Fla. 1959).
62. Id. at 463. The court noted that at the time of the murder "there existed much
turmoil and excitement with remnants of the Batista regime fighting with the victorious
Castro troops and arrests and executions were commonplace." Id.
In re Gonzales, 217 F. Supp. 717 (S.D.N.Y. 1963) also involved the murder of prison-
ers. This time the requesting party was the Dominican Republic and the court was will-
ing to admit that the exception is applied "with greater liberality where the demanding
state is a totalitarian regime seeking the extradition of one who has opposed the regime
in the cause of freedom." Id. at 721 n.9.
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In re Mylonas6 provides yet another example of judicial manipu-
lation of the exception to deny the extradition of an anti-communist
political leader. Mylonas was charged with embezzling funds while act-
ing as a city councilman in Greece prior to his ouster from office by the
Communist Party. Although there was no evidence that the alleged
crime was committed for any political purpose, the court concluded
that the exception applied because the crime "was incidental to,
formed a part, and was the aftermath of political disturbances."4
The existence of political upheavals at the time of the crime
proved determinative in In re McMullen,66 the first United States ex-
tradition case to involve a member of a modern urban terrorist
organization.
In 1976 the extradition of Peter McMullen was requested by the
United Kingdom on the basis of an arrest warrant charging him with
attempted murder. The charges arose out of the bombing of a British
army barracks at Yorkshire, England in March 1974. McMullen, a
Catholic from Northern Ireland, had deserted the British army in 1972
to join up with the Provisional Irish Republican Army (P.I.R.A.)." In
the following two years, McMullen allegedly took part in a number of
terrorist bomb attacks, including the one on the Yorkshire army
barracks.
McMullen was arrested in the Republic of Ireland where he was
sentenced to a prison term of three years for membership in an illegal
organization-the I.R.A.67 After his release from jail, McMullen is al-
leged to have had a falling out with his former comrades and to have
tried to sever his connections with them. Fearing that McMullen might
cooperate with authorities and reveal the names of other members, the
P.I.R.A. sentenced him to death,6 but McMullen fled to the United
States before the sentence could be carried out.
McMullen was subsequently arrested and brought before a United
63. 187 F. Supp. 716 (N.D. Ala. 1960).
64. Id. at 721.
65. No. 3-78-1099 MG (N.D. Cal. May 11, 1979).
66. The Provisional Irish Republican Army, more commonly called the provos, is a
radical branch of the I.R.A. They claim that the British rule in Northern Ireland can
only be ended through the use of violence. Preaching a blend of Irish nationalism and
marxist ideology, they demand the ouster of not only the British from Northern Ireland,
but also of the democratically elected government of the Republic of Ireland. See gener-
ally T. CooGAN, THE I.R.A. (8th ed. 1982).
67. Id.
68. The I.R.A. and the provos are notorious for knee capping and, in more serious
cases, for killing informers and former members who cooperate with the authorities. See
generally id.
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States magistrate for a hearing on the request for his extradition. The
magistrate applied the Castioni test and denied extradition on the
grounds that the criteria necessary for the political offense exception
had been satisfied.69 The magistrate took judicial notice of the fact
that "an insurrection and a disruptive uprising of political nature did
in fact exist" in Northern Ireland at the time of the offense"0 and con-
cluded that the accused had acted as a member of "an organization
existing in an era of political upheaval, which was engaged in and con-
ducted political violence, of the most extreme nature with a solely po-
litical objective. 7' These factors alone were sufficient for the magis-
trate to hold that McMullen's act was a political offense within the
meaning of the exception.
A somewhat different result was reached in Abu Eain v. Wilkes,
72
where the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit applied a test sig-
nificantly different from that laid down in Castioni and concluded that
the bombing of civilians in Israel does not come within the scope of the
political offense exception contained in the treaty of extradition be-
tween the United States and Israel.7s
On May 14, 1979 the Israeli resort town of Tiberias, near the Sea
of Galilee, was crowded with people celebrating the anniversary of
Israel's independence. On that afternoon a bomb which had been
planted in a refuse bin at the marketplace in the center of town ex-
ploded, killing two teenagers and leaving thirty other people maimed
or seriously injured.7"
After months of investigation the Israeli police obtained a confes-
sion from Jamil Yasin, a resident of the West Bank, which implicated
Ziyad Abu Eain in the crime. According to Yasin's statement, both
Eain and himself were active in the Al Fatah branch of the P.L.O., and
as members of this "liberation" movement they had gone to Tiberias
on May 11, 1979 to find a suitable location in which to plant an explo-
sive device. 75 On the day of the explosion Yasin gave Eain the device
with instructions as to its placement and location. Yasin did not ac-
company Eain out of fear of being recognized but learned of the "suc-
cess" of the operation from a news report later that day.
69. In re McMullen, slip op. at 3.
70. Id. at 4.
71. Id. at 4-5.
72. 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981).
73. United States-Israel Extradition Convention, Dec. 5, 1963, 14 U.S.T. 1707,
T.I.A.S. No. 5476. Extradition will not be granted when the "offense is regarded by the
requested party as one of a political character or if the person sought proves that the
request for his extradition has, in fact, been made with a view to trying him or punishing
him for an offense of a political character." Id. art. VI.
74. 641 F.2d at 507.
75. Id. at 509.
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After the Israeli police had rounded up a number of P.L.O. sus-
pects, Yasin warned Eain that he might be in danger. Eain, fearing
that the investigators were closing in on him, fled to the United States
via Jordan." He took up residence in Chicago with his sister and re-
mained there until his arrest by F.B.I. agents on August 22, 1979.11
At his extradition hearing in the Northern District of Illinois, the
magistrate found that the statements made by his accomplice, Yasin,
the substance of which was corroborated by an Israeli police officer,
together with self-incriminating statements made by Eain to the F.B.I.
agents at the time of his arrest, were sufficient to establish probable
cause.7 8 Upon finding that Eain had not sustained his burden of proof
on the question of the political offense exception, the magistrate deter-
mined that the petitioner should be extradited back to Israel to face
the criminal charges against him. Eain's petition to the district court
for a writ of habeas corpus to prevent his extradition was equally
unsuccessful.
79
On appeal to the Seventh Circuit, Eain's principle claim was that
his crimes were relative political offenses and, therefore, he should be
exempt from extradition." Before proceeding to the merits of the peti-
tioner's claim, the court rejected the government's argument that the
court lacked authority to apply the political offense exception because
it was "a political question which should be the sole responsibility of
the 'political branches' to decide. . . ."" Noting that the courts of the
United States had never "declined to consider the applicability of the
political offense exception when it was squarely presented,"8 the court
held that the political offense exception did not involve "aEn initial pol-
icy determination of a kind clearly for non-judicial discretion.""
76. Id.
77. Id. at 510.
78. Id. at 510-11.
79. In re Abu Eain, No. 79-175 (N.D. Ill. Dec. 18, 1979), aff'd sub noma. Ziyad Abu
Eain v. Wilkes, No. 80-1487 (N.D. Ill. 1980).
80. Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894 (1981). In addi-
tion to the political offense claim, Eain argued that there was no basis for a finding of
probable cause and that even if probable cause could be found the charges were merely a
subterfuge to enable Israel to try him for the political offense of being a member of the
P.L.O. The court found no merit in either argument.
Eain's subterfuge claim was held to be a matter for the executive branch because
"political questions would permeate any judgement on the motivation of a foreign gov-
ernment." Id. at 516-17.
81. Id. at 512. The government was relying on the political question doctrine as set
forth in Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962).
82. 641 F.2d at 513.
83. Id. at 514. The need for an initial policy determination is one of the six criteria
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Having concluded that it was the proper forum to decide the peti-
tioner's claim, the court stated that the petitioner's action would be
considered political for the purposes of the exception if there were "vi-
olent political disturbances" at the time of their occurrence and if they
were "incidental" to that disturbance.8 4
Although the court was willing to accept that there may have been
a political conflict in Israel at the time that Eain was accused of plant-
ing the bomb,85 it held that his act was not incidental to the P.L.O.'s
objectives but, rather, was a random act of violence perpetrated against
innocent civilians for the sole purpose of destroying the social fabric of
the community. "The exception," the court stated, "does not make a
random bombing intended to result in the cold-blooded murder of ci-
vilians incidental to a purpose of toppling a government, absent a di-
rect link between the perpetrator, a political organization's political
goals, and the specific act."'86 The court agreed with the magistrate's
findings that Eain had failed to establish a direct link between these
three criteria and likened his actions, and the political goals and meth-
ods of the P.L.O. in general, to those of anarchists who, the court said,
had been consistently denied the protection of the political offense ex-
ception by the United States and other nations since the decision in
Meunier.
7
The vagueness of the term "political disturbance" and the inher-
ent subjectivity in analyzing "incidental" acts to that disturbance ena-
bled the court to deny the claim of a member of a political movement
for which there is little sympathy in this country. This case, laudable
in that it did not offer protection to a member of a violent terrorist
organization, nonetheless exemplifies the arbitrariness of decisions in
extradition cases because they are based on an implicit, subjective
value judgement and not on explicit, objective criteria.
Even though the P.L.O. and the I.R.A. are indistinguishable in
both methods and goals, the Eain court showed an obvious reluctance
to grant political status to a member of an organization which the Ex-
ecutive branch has refused to recognize even though many other gov-
ernments and international organizations have recognized the P.L.O.
as the political representatives of the Palestinian people. The court
under Baker for holding a claim non-justiciable. The court also rejected the application
of the political question doctrine on the grounds that it had "discoverable and managea-
ble standards," another of the Baker criteria, upon which to construe the exception. Id.
at 515.
84. Id. at 516.
85. Id. at 519.
86. Id. at 521.
87. Id.
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avoided having to reach a conclusion similar to the one reached in Mc-
Mullen by excluding from the ambit of the political offense exception
acts aimed at destroying the social fabric of a society. The court added,
by implication, another element to the Castioni test: the act must be
reasonably designed to achieve the goal of political turmoil.88 However,
the court laid down no guidelines that would enable this factor to be
evaluated in a predictable fashion in future cases. For example, how
could it be determined that the shooting of a British soldier in Belfast,
in and of itself, could further the I.R.A.'s ultimate goals or be reasona-
bly designed to bring these goals to fruition?
In Matter of Mackin,s" the Court of Appeals for the Second Cir-
cuit returned to the analysis set forth in McMullen and upheld a mag-
istrate's findings9" that the offenses for which a P.I.R.A. member's ex-
tradition was sought were within the political offense exception
contained in the extradition treaty between the United Kingdom and
the United States.' 1
Mackin was indicted in Northern Ireland on March 16, 1978, on
charges of attempted murder of a British soldier. While out on bail he
fled to the United States where on October 6, 1980, he was arrested by
F.B.I. agents.92 At his extradition hearing, Mackin admitted being a
88. Id. This element is, in fact, an adaptation of the Swiss theory of "predominance"
which limits the political offense exception to acts of a "predominantly political charac-
ter." See Note, Bringing the Terrorist to Justice: A Domestic Law Approach, 11 COR-
NELL INT'L L.J. 71, 82 (1978). See also Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1251-56.
89. 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981). The actual holding of the appeals court was that the
magistrate's decision denying the extradition request of the United Kingdom was not
directly appealable. Id. at 130.
90. In the Matter of the Requested Extradition of Dermond Mackin, No. 80 Cr. Misc.
1, p. 54 (S.D.N.Y. Aug. 13, 1981), aff'd, 668 F.2d 122 (2d Cir. 1981).
91. United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty, supra note 10.
92. 668 F.2d at 124. Mackin was detained pursuant to a provisional arrest warrant
issued under the provisions of the United States-United Kingdom Extradition Treaty,
supra note 10, which provides:
In urgent cases the person sought may, in accordance with the law of the re-
quested party, be provisionally arrested on application through the diplomatic
channel by the competent authorities of the requesting Party. The application
shall contain an indication of intention to request the extradition of the person
sought and ... such further information, if any, as would be necessary to justify
the issue of a warrant of arrest had the offense been committed, or the person
sought had been convicted, in the territory of the requested Party.
Id. art. VIII.
Extradition procedures in the United States are governed by 18 U.S.C. § 3184
(1976). This section provides that:
Whenever there is a treaty or convention for extradition between the United
States and any foreign government, any justice or judge of the United States, or
any magistrate authorized so to do by a court of the United States, or any judge
[Vol. 4
INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION
member of the P.I.R.A., a group committed to the use of violence to
remove the British presence from Northern Ireland. Although there
was conflicting evidence at the hearing as to the exact chain of events
that had occurred and resulted in an injury to a British soldier, the
magistrate held that the United Kingdom had demonstrated probable
cause9 3 on the issue of Mackin's possession and firing of a gun at the
scene.
9 4
The magistrate went on to say that there was no dispute,95 but
that the test set forth by the English Court in In re Castioni" was the
proper framework for determining whether the offense should be con-
sidered a non-extraditable, relative97 political offense.98 In applying the
of a court of general jurisdiction of any State, may, upon complaint made under
oath, charging any person found within his jurisdiction, with having committed
within the jurisdiction of any such foreign government any of the crimes pro-
vided for by such treaty or convention, issue his warrant for the apprehension of
the person so charged, that he may be brought before such justice, judge or mag-
istrate, to the end that the evidence of his criminality may be heard and consid-
ered. If, on such hearing, he deems the evidence sufficient to sustain the charge
under the provisions of the proper treaty or convention . . . he shall issue his
warrant for the commitment of the person so charged to the proper jail, there to
remain until surrender shall be made.
Id. This section only applies when there is an extradition treaty between the United
States and the requesting state. 18 U.S.C. § 3181 (Supp. V 1981).
Extradition hearings merely determine whether there is sufficient evidence to justify
the accused's extradition. Collins v. Loisel, 259 U.S. 309, 316-7 (1922). The evidentiary
standard is one of probable cause. The accused may not proffer evidence relating to his
innocence or even to rebut the existence of probable cause, but he may offer evidence to
"clarify" evidence of probable cause introduced by the requesting state. Shapiro v. Fer-
randina, 478 F.2d 894, 905 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 884 (1973). See gener-
ally M. BASSlOUNI, INTERNATIONAL EXTRADITION AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER 511-37 (1974).
If the court grants the extradition request it is then up to the secretary of state,
under 18 U.S.C. § 3186 (1976), to decide whether or not to surrender the accused to the
requesting state. He may decline to surrender the accused for a number of reasons, in-
cluding lack of sufficient evidence to support the charges or because the crime does not
fall within the provisions of the treaty. See 4 G. HACKwORTH, DIGEST OF INTERNATIONAL
LAW § 3134, at 174 (1942). He may also consider the political climate in the requesting
state and deny access to the accused on humanitarian grounds. See In re Sindona, 450 F.
Supp. 672, 694 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), habeas corpus denied sub nom. Sindona v. Grant, 461 F.
Supp. 199 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), afl'd, 619 F.2d 167, 173-74 (2d Cir. 1980).
93. Article IX(1) of the extradition treaty states: "Extradition shall be granted only if
the evidence be found sufficient according to the law of the requested Party ... to jus-
tify the committal for trial of the person sought if the offenses of which he is accused has
been committed in the territory of the requested Party." United States-United Kingdom
Extradition Treaty, supra note 10.
94. In re Mackin, slip op. at 21.
95. But see, e.g., SHEARER, supra note 1, at 180.
96. [1891] 1 Q.B. 149.
97. The "political offense" concept has traditionally been applied to two different
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test enunciated in Castioni to the facts of the case before her, the mag-
istrate mechanically applied the three factors that lie at the heart of
the test: "(1) whether there was a war, rebellion, revolution or political
uprising at the time and site of the commission of the offense; (2)
whether Mackin was a member of the uprising group; and (3) whether
the offense was 'incidental to' and 'in furtherance of' the political
uprising." s
In a detailed discussion of both the historical and more recent vio-
lence that has occurred in Ireland,'00 the magistrate noted the long
standing social, economic and political discrimination inflicted upon
the Nationalist minority in Northern Ireland by the Loyalist major-
ity."'1 Given the violent methods used by the I.R.A. in response, the
magistrate had little difficulty finding that there was a political upris-
ing at the time and site of the offense.0 ' Likewise, the magistrate had
little difficulty in finding that Mackin's active membership in the
P.I.R.A. satisfied the second part of the test.103
The third, and possibly weakest, link in this chain is the require-
ment that the act be committed "incidental to" and "in furtherance
of" a political disturbance. There must be substantial connection be-
tween the specific act and the political activity and goals of the upris-
ing group.'"' Eain1° s was cited' °6 for the proposition that this direct
types of criminal acts, "purely political offenses" and "relative political offense(s)." Gar-
cia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1230. Pure political offenses are acts directed against the
state, such as treason, sedition and espionage and contain none of the elements of ordi-
nary crime. Cantrell, supra note 17, at 780. A relative political offense is one "in which a
common crime is so connected with a political act that the entire offense is regarded as
political." Garcia-Mora, supra note 7, at 1230-31.
98. In re Mackin, slip op. at 24.
99. Id. at 47.
100. Id. at 49-84.
101. See id. at 54. The term Loyalist refers to those who are "loyal" to the concept of
a United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland.
102. See id. at 57. One reason for this lack of difficulty was the simplistic and rule-
oriented approach employed. In order to ascertain the level of violence necessary to con-
stitute a political rising, thereby satisfying the first element of the political offense ex-
ception, the magistrate said that "we look to the language in In re Castioni for guidance
in determining the level of violence required." In re Mackin, slip op. at 77. She went on
to say that "the level of violence . . . was of sufficient severity and in the nature of the
political uprising as contemplated by In re Castioni." Id. at 78. This type of analysis will
not generate a standard capable of producing predictable results or reflecting community
policies.
103. Id. at 85.
104. See Castioni, [18911 1 Q.B. at 166.
105. Abu Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d 504 (7th Cir. 1981), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 894
(1981).
106. In re Mackin, slip op. at 96.
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link is necessary to prevent "isolated acts of social violence undertaken
for personal reasons"10 from being protected simply because they oc-
curred during a political uprising.108 While Mackin's act of shooting at
a member of the British army could not possibly bring to fruition the
goals of his organization, 0 9 the fact that the act occurred in the con-
text of a confrontation between "two parties in the State as to which is
to have the government in its hands"'1 0 and was devoid of personal
malice enabled the magistrate to find that the third part of the test
was satisfied.
Although the magistrate expressed concern that "the political of-
fense exception should not be applied so as to create a safe haven for
terrorists in the United States,""' Mackin's actions were held to have
fallen within the political offense exception and the extradition request
was denied.'1
2
The analyses in Mackin and in McMullen did not depart from the
precedent set down in United States and British extradition case law
over the last hundred years. Consequently, there was no discussion of
the public policy and the community expectations existing in the
United States, the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland that
political change be accomplished by peaceful, non-violent means.
The results in these cases, which were almost mandated by judicial
precedent, give the appearance of official United States sanction to the
I.R.A. and frustrates the efforts of two friendly, democratic govern-
ments to stamp out the use of violence by fringe elements in their soci-
eties. The decisions put much weight on the fact that the violence was
directed against the British army and not against innocent civilians as
was the case in Eain. In terms of the preferences and the expectations
of the communities involved, this is a totally irrelevant consideration.
The activities of the I.R.A. are condemned not only in the United
Kingdom but in the Republic of Ireland-the country with which the
I.R.A. wishes to have Northern Ireland politically united. The Irish
Times". published an editorial the day after a police reservist and a
postman, who had no connection with the security forces but who was
107. 641 F.2d at 521.
108. Id.
109. This is hardly a revealing insight, considering the fact that similar acts have
been, and still are being committed, without achieving the I.R.A.'s ultimate goals.
110. In re Mackin, slip op. at 98 (quoting In re Castioni, [1891] 1 Q.B. at 156).
111. In re Mackin, slip op. at 99.
112. It should be noted that Mackin, because he had entered the country illegally,
was subsequently deported to the Republic of Ireland. Irish Independent, Dec. 30, 1981,
at 16, col. 7.
113. The Irish Times, Feb. 21, 1983, at 9, col. 1.
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temporarily filling in for another postman who was a part-time police
reservist, were killed, 14 and succinctly summed up the perspectives of
the people in the south of Ireland towards the I.R.A.:
It was the wrong postman, they say. Will they one day re-
alize that all the shootings have been wrong? Wrong and anti-
national? The litany of murders around the Border has been of
people of a modest position in life-bread-servers, milkmen
and the like. Yesterday they killed a police reservist. The grief
among the families of the dead, the resolution which such
crimes instill into their fellow-Unionists make talk of a United
Ireland a sad, sick joke.
[I]f the North drags on its bloody course much longer,
the whole country may become one that will not be worth liv-
ing in. 1 5
In Quinn v. Robinson,"' the third in the recent trilogy of P.I.R.A.
extradition cases, the district court refused to consider the methods
employed by this terrorist group to achieve its goals in the application
of the political offense exception. In reversing a magistrate's determi-
nation that Quinn, a member of the P.I.R.A., was subject to extradi-
tion, the district court stated that "[i]nherent in any situation where
political change is sought are conflicting opinions on the merits of the
sought-after change and the methods being used to seek the change.
Extradition courts must void [sic] becoming caught up in such
controversy."' 
1 7
The United Kingdom had requested that Quinn return to stand
trial on charges of conspiracy and murder. The conspiracy charge arose
out of his involvement with an active service unit of the P.I.R.A. that
had committed numerous bombings in the London area in 1974 and
1975.18 Quinn was wanted on a murder charge for killing a police of-
114. The 20-year-old reserve policeman was shot in the back as he left a store after
buying cigarettes and sweets. Id. at 1, col. 5. The three gunmen were reported to have
fired more than 50 shots using two submachine guns and a shotgun. The report went on
to point out that "The Provisional I.R.A. later admitted responsibility." Id. The slain
postman "was shot dead by Provisional I.R.A. members who apparently mistook him for
another postman who is a part-time member of the security forces" but who was on leave
that day to attend a funeral. Id. The postman was shot dead as he delivered a letter to
an isolated cottage by three gunmen who had earlier taken over the house. The gunmen
lured the postman to their ambush by posting a letter to that house the day before. Id.
115. Id. at 9, col. 1.
116. No. C-82-6688 RPA (N.D. Cal. 1983).
117. Id. at 38.
118. Id. at 5. Quinn had been implicated through fingerprints found on the incendi-
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ficer in 1975 in an incident unrelated to his activities with the
P.I.R.A. 11s
In September 1981, Quinn was arrested in California. At his extra-
dition hearing, the magistrate found that Quinn had not established
the criteria necessary to invoke the political offense exception and or-
dered his extradition to the United Kingdom. 20 The district court, on
a petition by Quinn for a writ of habeas corpus, reversed the magis-
trate's decision and held that Quinn's extradition was barred on both
the conspiracy and murder charges. 2 '
In reaching this decision, the court rejected a significant portion of
the analysis employed by the magistrate. First, the court rejected the
requirement that the accused prove his membership in the uprising
group, which the magistrate had adopted from the Mackin decision.'
The court reasoned that this "membership" requirement would have
placed the accused in the untenable position of having to waive his
fifth amendment rights against self-incrimination in order to invoke
the political offense exception. This, the court concluded, would have
been an unreasonable burden given that membership in a group com-
mitted to violence was, at most, "circumstantial evidence of his guilt
on the charged offense."123 Secondly, the court rejected the magis-
trate's application of the incidence test in evaluating the offenses in
terms of their effectiveness in achieving the political goals of the ac-
cused,1 2' noting that the "choices of action by an uprising group are
not proper considerations for the extradition court when considering
ary devices in at least six bombing incidents, including a letter bomb sent to the Roman
Catholic Bishop to the British Armed Forces in a hollowed-out Bible. Id. at 6-8. Quinn's
fingerprints were also found on letter bombs which injured a judge and a security guard
at the offices of a daily newspaper, and on bombs planted at a railway station, a pub and
a restaurant. Id. Quinn's co-conspirators were arrested in December 1975 following a six-
day siege in a flat in Balcombe Street, London. The "Balcombe Street Four," as they
became known, were later tried and convicted under the British Prevention of Terrorism
Act. Id. at 10-11.
119. Id. at 8-10. In February 1975, Quinn had been stopped for questioning by a
police officer on routine patrol in search of burglary suspects. When Quinn began to act
suspiciously, the officer attempted to search him. At that, Quinn began to flee. Another
officer, dressed in civilian clothes, observed the chase and tried to block Quinn's path.
Quinn shot him and made good his escape. Id. Neither officer had known that Quinn was
a member of the P.I.R.A.
120. Id. at 2.
121. Id. at 40, 44.
122. Id. at 16-17. See supra text accompanying note 99.
123. Quinn v. Robinson, slip op. at 20.
124. This was a factor that had been implicitly added to the Castioni test by the
Seventh Circuit in Eain. See supra text accompanying note 88.
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the applicability of the political offense exception."115
The court refused to extend the rationale of Eain-that the bomb-
ing of civilians was anarchist-like activity not covered by the political
offense exception12 6-to the facts in Quinn. The court reasoned that
because the terrorist activity in Eain was aimed at "the expulsion of a
certain population from the country,1127 while the violence perpetrated
by the P.I.R.A. was "to protest British rule in Northern Ireland, and to
bring the British to the bargaining table,' 2 8 the two cases were clearly
distinguishable. 12
9
In applying the traditional "incidence" test to the conspiracy
charge against Quinn, the court found that there existed a political up-
rising in the United Kingdom at the time of the offense and, because
"bombing incidents by those opposed to British rule are the historical
form of violent expression in the long controversy over such rule,"'2 0
the conspiracy was incidental to that political uprising.' 8 1
Even more troublesome was the court's willingness to find that the
murder of the police officer fell within the political offense exception.
The court rejected the magistrate's conclusion that the murder was a
purely criminal act. 2 According to the court, the "evidence showed
that the killer's capture would lead, because of interrogation and possi-
bly torture, to the discovery of the bomb factory, and that the killer
shot the only man who had a chance of stopping his flight from the
police."' s The court concluded that the murder was, therefore, inci-
dental to and in the course of the political uprising."
Decisions such as those in Quinn, Mackin and McMullen have
given rise to the claim that the political offense exception, as it has
been defined and applied within the parameters of the Castioni test,
125. Quinn v. Robinson, slip op. at 29-30.
126. See supra text accompanying notes 85-87.
127. Quinn v. Robinson, slip op. at 36.
128. Id.
129. Id. The court went so far as to criticize the Eain decision for endangering the
role of the judiciary as unbiased factfinders.
The [Eain] court's emotion in dealing with the case is reflected in its discussion
regarding terrorists who commit barbarous acts and its conclusion that the polit-
ical offense exception "should be applied with great care lest our country become
a social jungle and an encouragement to terrorists everywhere." . . . Such ex-
pressions of emotion have not been part of the historic function of the extradi-
tion court while determining the applicability of the political offense exception.
Id. at 37, quoting Eain v. Wilkes, 641 F.2d at 520.
130. Quinn v. Robinson, slip op. at 40.
131. Id. at 39.
132. Id. at 43.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 44.
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has outlived its usefulness. 85 Admittedly, one of the principal reasons
for the judicial system's inability to deal with the dilemma posed by
requests for the extradition of terrorists has been the failure of nations
to revise their extradition laws and bilateral treaties.18 6 Although some
nations have entered into multilateral treaties and international con-
ventions that specifically exempt certain acts of terrorism from the
protections of the political offense exception's 7 these efforts have, up
to now, proven to be insufficient. However, it is not necessary to elimi-
nate the exception, which, when properly applied, can afford protection
to political dissidents from repression by tyrannical governments, in
order to bring I.R.A. terrorists and their like to justice. The holding in
Eain, with its focus on the accused's purpose, the degree of connection
between the nature of the crime and the ultimate ends sought, and the
overall modus operandi of the terrorist group, provides an example of
how the political offense exception can be effectively applied in this
age of modern terrorism.
The judgment of the Irish Supreme Court in McGlinchey v.
Wren"' provides a further example of enlightened application of the
political offense exception. McGlinchey had been sought by the author-
ities in Northern Ireland to stand trial for the murder of an elderly
woman during a raid on a post office. Although he contended that dur-
ing the relevant time period he had been active in the P.I.R.A. and
that the murder was connected with that activity, the lower courts re-
jected McGlinchey's claim that the crime was a political offense.18'
In denying McGlinchey's appeal, the Irish Supreme Court took the
opportunity to distinguish between terrorist acts and political activity
135. As one commentator has argued:
The right not to extradite those who are being sought merely for their acts of
conscience can be preserved through existing mechanisms of judicial approval
and executive authority to grant asylum. There is no good reason to preserve the
exception and there are many excellent reasons for concluding that the excep-
tion has outlived its usefulness and has needlessly hampered harmonious and
pragmatic international relations.
Epps, supra note 3, at 88.
136. See Cantrell, supra note 18, at 777.
137. See, e.g., The European Extradition Convention, Council of Europe, 359
U.N.T.S. 273, Europ. T.S. No. 24; Tokyo Convention on Aviation: Offenses and Certain
Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft, Sept. 14, 1963, 20 U.S.T. 2941, T.I.A.S. No.
6768 (effective Dec. 4, 1969); Draft Convention for the Prevention and Punishment of
Certain Acts of International Terrorism, Sept. 25, 1972, U.N. Doc. A/C.6/L.85.
138. [19821 Ir. R. 154.
139. Id. at 158. In his appeal to the Supreme Court, McGlinchey no longer contended
that his crime was a political offense, but instead claimed as a separate ground that he
believed that if removed from the state he would be prosecuted for a political offense or
an offense connected with a political offense. Id. at 159.
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which, even if formally criminal, was exempt from extradition:
It appears from the material exhibited in the plaintiff's af-
fidavit that the victim of the murder for which delivery to
Northern Ireland is sought was an elderly grandmother. She
was riddled with bullets in the early hours of the morning,
when her house was attacked, front and rear, by a gang firing
Armalite rifles from a moving car. Other members of her family
including her aged husband and a daughter narrowly escaped
death. This revolting and cowardly crime is one which should
readily shock the conscience of any normal person and which
assuredly dishonours any cause that might have been espoused
by its perpetrators....
Because of the particular circumstances of the offence
charged in the warrant, and, especially, because of the conces-
sions made on behalf of the plaintiff, it is unnecessary to seek
to draw a line of demarcation between an ordinary criminal of-
fence and one which falls to be classified as a political offence
or an offence connected with a political offence. I would wish to
point out, however, that it should not be deduced that if the
victim were someone other than a civilian who was killed or
injured as a result of violent criminal conduct chosen in lieu of
what would fall directly or indirectly within the ordinary scope
of political activity, the offence would necessarily be classified
as a political offence or an offence connected with a political
offence.
The judicial authorities on the scope of such offences have
in many respects been rendered obsolete by the fact that mod-
ern terrorist violence, whether undertaken by military or
paramilitary organisations, or by individuals or groups of indi-
viduals, is often the antithesis of what could reasonably be re-
garded as political, either in itself or in its connections. All that
can be said with authority in this case is that, with or without
the concession made on behalf of the plaintiff, this offence
could not be said to be either a political offence or an offence
connected with a political offence. Whether a contrary conclu-
sion would be reached in different circumstances must depend
on the particular circumstances and on whether those particu-
lar circumstances showed that the person charged was at the
relevant time engaged, either directly or indirectly, in what
reasonable, civilized people would regard as political.
This Court is invited to assume that because of the
existence of widespread violence organised by paramilitary
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groups in Northern Ireland, any charge associated with terror-
ist activity should be regarded as a charge in respect of a polit-
ical offence or an offence connected with a political offence. I
am not prepared to make any such assumption."'
The McGlinchey and Eain cases are part of an evolving process of
interpretation and clarification of extradition law. The judgments
handed down by American courts in the P.I.R.A. extradition cases
clearly demonstrate that further development in this area of the law is
needed. Given that the decision as to whether a person should be ex-
tradited is in the final analysis a matter of judicial policy and not of
legal definition, such courts must develop a focus of inquiry which re-
jects the use violence unless, and only unless, the political institutions
of a given state do not permit other avenues for the expression of polit-
ical dissent.
Michael Aidan O'Connor
140. Id. at 159-60. McGlinchey, who was free on bail at the time, absconded before
the decision was handed down. He evaded capture until March, 1984 when, following a
shootout with Irish police, he was taken into custody. That same evening, he was driven
to the border and handed over to the Northern Ireland authorities. See N.Y. Times,
March 19, 1984, at A3, col. 4. McGlinchey, who had formed the Irish National Liberation
Army, a Marxist offshoot of the P.I.R.A., had claimed in an interview given while he was
on the run "that he had taken part in 30 killings and at least 200 acts of terrorism." Id.
1983]

